This paper provides a real option methodology for evaluating R&D investment opportunities assuming that potential competitors can enter in the market. As it is well known, R&D investments are made often in a phased manner and so each stage creates an opportunity (option) for subsequent investment. Therefore, R&D projects can be considered as 'Compound Exchange Options' in which investments present uncertainty both in the gross project value and in costs. According to Majd and Pindyck (1987) , in a real options context, "dividends" are the opportunity costs inherent in the decision to defer an investment project and so deferment implies the loss of project's cash flows. Moreover, Trigeorgis (1996) incorporates the preemption effect through the "competitive dividends" which are the cash flows that can be eroded by anticipated competitive arrivals. In this paper we propose to value, using Montecarlo simulation, the R&D investments of a pioneer firm assuming that the Development cost can be spent in two moments: t 2 or t 3 . If the Develpment cost is realized in t 2 no firms enters in the market since the rivals' R&D plan is not yet concluded otherwise, if the investment D is delayed at time t 3 waiting better market conditions, other rivals can enter in the market and so the opportunity costs ("dividends") increase.
Introduction
In recent years, academic studies have argued that traditional valuation model, NPV (net present value), can not adequately capture the value of an investment project. Therefore, the real options approach becomes very important to give explicit valutations of managerial flexibility to grow, delay, scale down or abandon projects (Smith 2003) . The main difference between the NPV rule and real options approach is that while the first considers uncertainty as a risk to be minimized, the second takes uncertainty as an opportunity for maximizing the value of a project. In real options, the options involve real assets as opposed to financial ones. So the project value can be valued quantitatively using the analogue option pricing theory as developed in the modern finance. In case of financial options, optimal exercise strategies can be derived without consideration of strategic interaction across option holders. However, it is widely acknowledged that a competitive environment may have a considerable impact on the valuation of real options. Under the threat of competition, the exercise of options strategically depends on the tradeoff between the benefits and costs of going ahead with an investment against waiting for more information. Waiting can have an informational benefit (McDonald and Siegel 1986) . However, if a firm chooses to defer exercising its option until better information is received (thus resolving uncertainty), it runs the risk that other firms may preempt it by exercising first (Zhu and Weyant 1999) . Such an early exercise by a competitor can erode the profits or even force the option to expire prematurely. If a real options is held in isolation by a single firm, no competitive interations should be considered and so, the decision to invest is not influenced by any rival's actions (Dixit and Pindyck 1994) . But, most of the real investment opportunity are shared with other firms. Then, when this is the case, the models should incorporate this competitive dimension, since it could have a considerable impact on the decision to invest. Game theory is a regular tool that come down of industrial organization and model in imperfect competition as is presented in Grenadier (1996) , Weeds (2002) , Tsekrekos (2003) , Huisman (2001) and so on. In these papers the problem is, basically, the following: two competing firms have the option to invest and enter in a duopoy market; the first company to do so (the Leader or pioneer) may benefit, after investing, from a temporary or permanent competitive advantage over the other firm (the Follwer), by securing, for example, a higher market share. In addition, during the last two decades, numerous studies have attempted to apply option pricing formula to R&D investment. As it is well know, R&D investments are made often in a phased manner, with the commencement of subsequent phase being dependent on the successuful completation of the preceding phase. Each stage provides information about the R&D success and creates an opportunity (option) for subsequent investment. Therefore, R&D projects can be considered as 'Compound Exchange Options' in which investments present uncertainty both in the gross project value and in costs. The most important valuation models of exchange options are given in Margrabe (1978) , McDonald and Siegel (1985) , Carr (1988) , Carr (1995) and Armada et al. (2007) . In particular way, McDonald and Siegel (1985) and Margrbe (1978) value a simple European exchange option (SEEO), Carr (1988) develops a model to price a compound European exchange option (CEEO) and Carr(1995) and Armada et al. (2007) present the pricing of a simple American exchange option (SAEO). However, if we consider the possibility that the development investment can be realized in two moments before the maturity time, we have a pseudo compound American exchange option. In this case numerical approximation is an important task as withnessed by the contribution of Tilley (1993), Barraquand and Martineau (1995) , Broadie and Glasserman (1997) , Longstaff and Schwartz (2001) . Aim of this paper is to propose a new way to value the R&D investment opportunity of a pioneer firm assuming that potential rivals can enter in the market. The sudden entry of a competitor may significantly diminish the current cash flow deriving from an existing asset and so alter its value. In real market terms, dividends may represent several types of opportunity costs caused by holding the real option unexercised, namely the loss of project's cash flows when an investment opportunity is postponed as it shown in Majd and Pindyck (1987) and Trigeorgis (1996) . Specifically, we consider that R&D project deferment may contribute to the early entrance of competitors in a competitive environment that produces a negative impact on the R&D project value. The structure of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the option model to value the R&D investment opportunity of a pioneer firm assuming that other rivals can enter in the market. First of all, we analyses the case with a single and two potential rivals and, after that, we propose a general case with the threat of k potential competitors. We use a Monte Carlo approach to value the pioneer R&D opportunity. In Section 3 we propose a numerical application showing as the pioneer's R&D opportunity value depend on the number of potential rivals that can erode cash-flows and on the information revalation. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
The Basic Model
In this section, we propose to value the R&D investment opportunity of a pioneer firm assuming that potential competitors can enter in the market. The sudden entry of a competitor may significantly diminish the current cash flow deriving from an existing asset and so alter its value. In this connection, we consider that the Development cost can be spent in two moments: t 2 or t 3 . If the Development investment is realized in t 2 no firm enters in the market, as the rivals' R&D plan is not yet concluded. Otherwise, if the Development cost is delayed at time t 3 waiting better market conditions, other rivals can enter in the market and so the opportunity costs, namely dividend-yields, increase. About the frame of an R&D investment, we denote by:
• R the Research Investment spent at initial time t 0 = 0;
• IT the Investment Technology payed at time t 1 . We suppose that IT = ϕD is a proportion of asset D;
• D the Development Investment that can be realized at time t 2 or at time t 3 . Obviously, we suppose that t 1 < t 2 < t 3 ;
• V the Gross Project value obtained spending the Develpment Investment D.
We assume that V and D follow a geometric brownian motion process given by:
where µ v and µ d are the expected rates of return on asset V and D respectively, δ d and δ v are the corresponding dividend yields, σ In addition, assuming by q and p the R&D success probability of pioneer firm and potential competitors respectively, we introduce two Bernoulli random variates X and Y :
The R&D Investment of pioneer firm generates an information revelation that influences the investment decision of other firms. So, if pioneer R&D investment is successful, the rivals probability p changes in positive information revelation p + . Using Dias (2004) model, it results that:
where the correlation ρ(X, Y ) is measure of information revelation from pioneer to rivals. About the evolution of asset V , we can distinguish two situations:
• If the pioneer firm spends the Development Investment D at time t 2 , it obtains the monopolistic Gross Project value V at time t 2 . In this case no rival is entered in the market and so no cash flow is lost. We can state that δ v = 0 in Eq. (1) and consequently the evolution of asset V evolution becomes:
• If the pioneer firm postpones the Development Investment D at time t 3 waiting better market conditions, other firms can enter in the market and so to reduce the pioneer cash flows. In this case δ v assumes positive values depending on the number of rivals that invest with success in R&D. We denote by k the number of potential rivals and by h the number of competitors that realize successfully the R&D project, with h ≤ k. The Gross project value for the pioneer firm is the asset value V at time t 3 assuming positive values of δ v , that we denote by V hδ . The evolution of asset V hδ is given by Eq.(1) considering positive dividends:
In particular way, in case of all rivals failure (h = 0), the Gross project value for the pioneer is the asset V at time t 3 without dividends. In this situation, the evolution of asset V is given by Eq.(5).
First
First of all, we analyse the pioneer R&D investment opportunity at time t 2 assuming that only a single firm can enter in the market and therefore k = 1. This situation may characterized an oligopoly market. The investment D will be realized at time t 2 if the exercised value V t2 − D t2 is bigger than waiting value and so the option value:
where:
is the value at time t 2 of a Simple European Exchange Option (SEEO) without dividends δ v and with maturity τ 2 = t 3 − t 2 . This option is obtained in case of rival's R&D failure (h = 0) with a probability 1 − p
is the value at time t 2 of a SEEO with positive dividends δ v and with maturity τ 2 . This option is obtained in case of rival's R&D success (h = 1) with a probability p Margrabe (1978) and McDonald & Siegel (1984) models, we have that:
and
Assuming the asset D as numeraire, we can reduce the by-dimensionality of inequality (7) to one variable P = V D :
namely:
• s(P t2 , 1, τ 2 ) is the value of a Simple European Option (SEO) whose underlying asset is P t2 without dividends (δ v = 0), the exercise price is equal to 1 and the risk-free rate is r = δ d ;
is the value of a SEO whose underlying asset is P t2 with dividends δ v , the exercise price is equal to 1 and the risk-free rate is r = δ d .
We determine the critical ratio price P * 1 that makes indifferent to invest or not at time t 2 solving the following equation:
So, the value of this investment opportunity at time t 1 is a particular Pseudo Simple American Exchange option (PSAEO) that can be exercised at time t 2 and t 3 , whose maturity time is τ = t 3 − t 1 . Denoting by S 1 (V t1 , D t1 , τ ) this PSAEO with k = 1, its payoff will be:
, the investment D is realized at time t 2 otherwise, if P t2 < P * 1 , the investment D is postponed at time t 3 and it will be carried out if the option is in the money. The pioneer firm does not know at time t 1 if the rival's R&D investment will be successfull or not. Therefore, we must consider the expectation value between two options. For instance, if p + = 1 (we are sure that the rival's R&D investment is successful), then the option payoff at time t 3 is max[V δ t3 − D t3 , 0]; if p + = 0 (we are sure that the rival's R&D investment has failed), then the option payoff at time t 3 is max[V t3 − D t3 , 0]. In order to determine the value of S 1 (V t1 , D t1 , τ ) with the threat of a single competitor (k = 1), we implement a Monte Carlo simulation assuming the asset D as numeraire. So we price te PSAEO as the expectation value of discounted cash-flows under the risk-neutral probability Q:
where τ 1 = t 2 − t 1 . Denoting by:
and using the asset D as numeraire given by Eq.(46) (see Appendix A), we have that:
where ∼ Q is the new risk-neutral probability equivalent to Q, as illustrated in Appendix A. Using Eqs. (13), (14) and (15), we can write that:
where S 1 (P t1 , 1, τ ) is the value of Pseudo Simple American option (PSAO) whose underlying asset is P t1 , the exercise price is equal to 1 and the risk-free rate r = δ d . Therefore we can write, using the Monte Carlo approximation with a single stochastic factor P , the PSAO S 1 (P t1 , 1, τ ) that can be exercised at time t 2 or t 3 as:
where H 1 = {j = 1...m s.t.P t2,j ≥ P * 1 },P t2,j are the simulated price of asset P and m is the number of simulations to determine the PSAO. Finally, the investment IT will be realized at time t 1 if the underlying value S 1 (V t1 , D t1 , τ ) is bigger than exercise price IT = ϕD t1 . This investment opportunity can be valued at time t 0 as a Compound Exchange option (CEO) c(S 1 , IT, t 1 ) whose underlying asset is S 1 (V t1 , D t1 , τ ), the exercise price is IT = ϕD t1 and the maturity date is t 1 . The final payoff is:
So, using the asset D as numeraire, we can write the value of pionner R&D investment opportunity c(S 2 , IT, t 1 ) at intial time t 0 = 0 as:
Using Monte Carlo simulation, it is possible to approximate:
where n is the number of simulation paths to compute the CEO. So for each path simulation i th , we have the priceP i t1 at time t 1 and starting from this value, we implement a new Monte Carlo simulation to determine the i th option S 2 (P i t1 , 1, τ ). Finally, investing R at time t 0 , the pioneer firm obtains, in case of success with a probability q, the investment opportunity which value is given by CEO c(S 1 , IT, t 1 ). So the Research investment R will be realized at time t 0 if the profit Π given by:
8 is positive. Fig. 1 summarizes the pioneer R&D investment with the threat of a single competitor. Moreover, the appendix B illustrates the Matlab algorithm to simulate the pioneer R&D investment opportunity with k = 1.
Second Case
Now we analyse the situation in which there are k = 2 potential firms that can enter in the market. So, the pioneer will be realize the investment D at time t 2 if the exercised value V t2 − D t2 is bigger than waiting value, namely the option value: . So we can remark that pioneer will obtain at time t 2 the monopolistic revenue s(V t2 , D t2 , τ 2 ) without to lose dividends in case of both rivals' failure (h = 0) with probability (1 − p + ) 2 , the oligopolistic revenue s(V δ t2 , D t2 , τ 2 ) losing the cash flow δ v in case of R&D success of only one rival (h = 1) with probability 2(1 − p + )p + and finally, the revenue s(V 2δ t2 , D t2 , τ 2 ) in case of both competitors' success (h = 2) with probability (p + ) 2 . Using Margrabe (1978) and McDonald & Siegel (1984) models we have that:
where P 2δ t2 = P t2 e −2δvτ2 . Assuming the asset D as numeraire, we can reduce the by-dimensionality to one variable P = V D . So we rewrite Eq. (22) as:
where s(P 2δ t2 , 1, τ 2 ) is the value of a SEO whose underlying asset is P t2 with dividends 2δ v . We determine the critical ration price P * 2 that makes indifferent to invest or not at time t 2 solving the following equation:
The value of this investment opportunity at time t 1 with the threat of k = 2 competitors entry is a PSAEO that can be exercised at time t 1 and t 2 , whose maturity time is τ ≡ t 3 − t 1 and that we denote by S 2 (V t1 , D t1 , τ ). Its payoff will be (V t2 − D t2 ) if P t2 ≥ P * 2 and so the pioneer realizes the investment D at time t 2 , otherwise it will be:
if P t2 < P * 2 , and so the investment D is postponed at time t 3 . As it is shown previously, in order to determine the value of S 2 (V t1 , D t1 , τ ) we use the Monte Carlo approach. So we price the PSAEO as the expectation value of discounted cash-flows under the risk-neutral probability Q:
Also in this case, using the asset D as numeraire given by Eq.(46) illustrated in Appendix A, we have that:
Therefore, using the Monte Carlo simulation, we can price the PSAO S 2 (P t1 , 1, τ ) using the stochastic factor P as:
where H 2 = {j = 1...m s.t. P t2,j ≥ P * 2 } and m is the number of simulations. Also in this case, the investment IT will be realized at time t 1 if the underlying value S 2 (V t1 , D t1 , τ ) is bigger than exercise price IT = ϕD t1 , otherwise the firm prefers to abandon the project. So this investment opportunity can be valued at time t 0 as a Compound Exchange option c(S 2 , IT, t 1 ) whose underlying asset is S 2 (V t1 , D t1 , τ ), the exercise price is IT = ϕD t1 and the maturity date is t 1 as t 0 = 0. The final payoff is:
So, using the asset D given by Eq.(46), we can write the value at time t 0 of pioneer R&D investment opportunity c(S 2 , IT, t 1 ) with the threat of k = 2 rivals:
where n is the number of simulation paths to determine the CEO.
General Case with k potential competitors entry.
Finally, we analyse the general case with k rivals that can enter in the market. So, the investment D will be realized at time t 2 if the exercised value V t2 − D t2 is 11 greater than waiting value:
Using Margrabe (1978) and McDonald & Siegel (1984) models we have that:
where P hδ t2 = P t2 e −hδvτ2 . Assuming the asset D as numeraire we reduce the bydimensionality of Eq.(33) to one variable P = V D :
After that, we determine the critical ratio price P * k that makes indifferent to invest or not at time t 2 solving the following equation:
We price the PSAEO S k (V t1 , D t1 , τ ) with the threat of k competitors entry as the expectation value of discounted cash-flows under the risk-neutral probability Q:
Using the same procedure, it results that:
By Monte Carlo simulation, we can approximate the value of PSAO S k (P t1 , 1, τ ) as:
where H k = {j = 1...m s.t. P t2,j ≥ P * k } and m is the number of simulations to compute the PSAO. Finally, using Monte Carlo simulation again, it is possible to approximate:
where n is the number of simulation paths in order to have the CEO.
Real Application
To illustrate the concepts and equations presented, we develop a numerical example to value a pioneer R&D investment opportunity assuming the threat of competitors that can erode the cash-flows. In particular we consider that:
• Gross Project Value: V 0 =220 000 $;
• Research Investment: R= 36 500 $;
• Investment Technology: IT 0 =30 000 $;
• The Gross Project Value V 0 is the present value of the R&D project's discounted expected cash flows. V is the underlying asset that the pioneer receives realizing investment D. We assume that the evolution of asset V follows Eq. (5) if no rival invests with success in R&D, or Eq. (6) if h rivals realize successfully the R&D program. The Development investment D 0 is the current amount of capital that the pioneer needs to invest today to receive the R&D project's value. We assume that D follows the geometric Brownian motion defined in Eq. (2) and it can be spent at time t 2 = 3 or at time t 3 = 4. As we consider a two-stage R&D plan, we considering two different investments denoted by R and IT . The first is the Reserch investment spent a time initial time t 0 = 0 that allows to obtain, in case of success, the investment opportunity, while IT 0 represents the current amount of Investment Technology to research innovations. We suppose that IT is a proportion ϕ of asset D; therefore it assumes the identical stochastic process of D, except that it occurs at time t 1 = 2 . Conveniently, we assume that the quoted shares and trade options of similar company are adequate proxies in order to value the volatility of assets V and D. In our application, δ v = 0.30 is the competitive dividend, namely the loss of cashflows deferring the R&D project owing to each competitor entrance in the market. Moreover, as pointed out by McDonald and Siegel (1986) , δ d is negative when there are carrying costs associated with a project's capital costs, while δ d is positive when there are technological befenits from the capital cost's level from deferring the project. We suppose δ d = 0.05. In addition, we consider that pioneer has an higher and more efficient Know-How than potential rivals and so, pioneer success probability is q = 0.60 while rivals' one is p = 0.55. Evaluation of R&D investment opportunity is generally a complex and computationally intensive problem. To determine the simulated R&D investment opportunity values, we have assumed the same number of path-simulations to compute the CEO and PSAO, and so n = m = 10 000. Moreover, Appendix B shows the Matlab algorithm about the Stratified Sample method to simulate the asset P that allows to reduce the variance. We assume that a = 0.80. Table 1 illustrates four simulated Monte Carlo values about the pioneer R&D investment. In particular way, we have considered three situation: in the first case there is a single potential competitor and so k = 1, in the second case we assume two potential rivals and so k = 2, and finally we have three potential competitors and therefore k = 3. For each situation we suppose three value about the information revelation from pioneer to rivals: ρ(X, Y ) = 0, 0.40 and 0.80. Moreover, we have considered the average among the four simulations in order to determine a single simulated value of CEO. The last column summarizes the pioneer profit Π that invests in R&D given by Eq.(21). Using the real option methodology, we are able to determine the value of pioneer R&D investment opportunity assuming the threat of rivals entry. In particular way we can observe that, when the information revelation ρ(X, Y ) and the number of potential competitors k increase, then the value of CEO goes down. By the competitive dividends, the option value takes into account the reduction of cash-flows that potential competitors can erode when the pioneer delays the realization of R&D waiting better market conditions. In addition, the increasing information revelation benefits the rivals R&D success and so the pioneer's option reduces its value. We can state that, if Π < 0, the pioneer firm preferes to abandon the R&D investment project at time t 0 otherwise, if Π > 0, the pioneer realizes the investment R at time t 0 . For our adapted numbers, it results that pioneer invests R at time t 0 when k = 1 for each information revelation value and when k = 2 without information revelation. In this case the profit Π is positive, as it is denoted by bold value in Table 1 . In the other situations, the pioneer prefers abandon the R&D program. Obviously, if R = 36 500 $, the pioneer's decision about the realization of R&D project investment changes. Finally, if the pioneer realizes the investments R at time t 0 and IT at time t 1 , it must decide whether to invest D at time t 2 or to delay the decision at final date t 3 , running the risk that potential rivals can erode its cash-flows. In particular, we can interpret the asset P as a profitability index since it is the ratio between the market value V and the development investment D. So, if the profitability index P t2 at time t 2 is bigger than critical market value P * k , the pioneer realizes the development investment D at time t 2 , otherwise it delays the decision at time t 3 . We can observe that, when the information revelation ρ(X, Y ) and the number of potential rivals k increase, the critical ratio P * k decreases. This means the reduction of critical profitability for which is indifferent to realize the investment D or to wait to invest. For instance, we assume that ρ(X, Y ) = 0.40 and the profitability index of pioneer R&D project P t2 = 1.07 at time t 2 . If the number of potential rivals k = 2, the pioneer prefers delay the investment decision at time t 3 waiting better market conditions since P t2 < 1.1128, while if the threat increases and so k = 3, the pioneer prefers invests at time t 2 in order to avoid the loss of cash-flows (preempt the rivals) since P t2 > 1.0522. In conclusion, the increase of threat arising from potential rivals' number and the information revelation reduces the critical level P * k under which the pioneer postpones the investment D at final time t 3 , as it is illustrated in Table 2 . 
Concluding Remark
In this paper we have shown as the information revelation and the threat of potential competitors can affect the pioneer decision about the realization of R&D investment. As it well known, the evaluation of R&D investment opportunity is generally complex and computationally intensive problem. In fact, an R&D investment is made in a phased manner, in which each stage provides information about the R&D success and creates an opportunity (option) for subsequent investment. Therefore, we have considered a two-stage R&D plan valuated as a compound option using the Monte Carlo approach. To reduce the variance of simulation we have used the Stratified Sample method.
In particular way, we have assumed that the threat of rivals' entrance in the market can diminish the cash-flows deriving from pioneer R&D project. To reach this objective, we have used the dividends as the cash-flows eroded by other rivals when an investment opportunity is postponed. We have analyzed two particular cases, k = 1, 2 and then a general case k. Finally, we have illustrated numerically that both the pioneer's R&D opportunity value (CEO) and the critical profitability index P * k decrease when the information revelation ρ(X, Y ) and the number of potential competitors k increase. This means the reduction of pioneer's opportunity to realize the investment R at time t 0 and to delay the investment D at time t 3 waiting better market conditions. are two Brownian motions under the risk-neutral probability measure ∼ Q and Z ′ is a Brownian motion under ∼ Q independent ofẐ d . By the Brownian motions defined in the Eqs. (47) and (48), we can rewrite the Eq. (43) for the asset P under the risk-neutral probability ∼ Q. So it results that:
Using the Eq. (48), it results that:
whereẐ v and Z ′ are independent under
, we can rewrite the Eq. (49):
where σ = σ 2 v + σ 2 d − 2σ v σ d ρ vd and Z p is a Brownian motion under ∼ Q. Using the log-transformation, we obtain the equation for the risk-neutral price simulation P with dividends:
and without dividends:
Using Eqs. (52) and (53), it is plain that P hδ t = P t e −hδv t .
B Matlab Algorithm with k = 1.
In this section we present the Matlab algorithm to determine the pioneer R&D investment opportunity value assuming that k = 1. Using Eq. (52), we can observe that Y = ln( 
